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Abstract—In the Internet of Things (IoT) devices are exposed
to various kinds of attacks when connected to the Internet. An
attack detection mechanism that understands the limitations of
these severely resource-constrained devices is necessary. This is
important since current approaches are either customized for
wireless networks or for the conventional Internet with heavy
data transmission. Also, the detection mechanism need not always
be as sophisticated. Simply signaling that an attack is taking place
may be enough in some situations, for example in NIDS using
anomaly detection. In graph networks, central nodes are the
nodes that bear the most influence in the network. The purpose
of this research is to explore experimentally the relationship
between the behavior of central nodes and anomaly detection
when an attack spreads through a network. As a result, we
propose a novel anomaly detection approach using this unique
methodology which has been unexplored so far in communication
networks. Also, in the experiment, we identify presence of an
attack originating and propagating throughout a network of IoT
using our methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been identified as the
top threat and IoT are increasingly becoming a powerful tool
for attackers engaged in DoS [1]. DoS is a kind of intrusion
that renders certain services inaccessible by the legitimate user.
It can be detected using a network intrusion detection system
(NIDS) deployed on the network at strategic junctions. These
NIDS can be broadly categorized into two. Firstly - misuse
detection, where the malicious behavior of the network has
been identified from prior attacks and have been cataloged for
future detection. Secondly- anomaly detection, where behavior
outside of modeled baseline behavior is termed as anomalous.
The fundamental difference between these two categories lies
in what information are they seeking from the collected system
data. While misuse-detection searches for description that is
close to a known malicious behavior, anomaly detection works
on the notion of separating normal behavior from the rest. In
anomaly-detection, normal network activity is identified and
any deviation is flagged. As such, these systems also do not
burden the network with heavy post-data collection analytic
work. This is true at least as long as the network is not
very dynamic forcing the baseline model to be recorded and
compared frequently. This is the reason why we lean towards
anomaly detection.
At present, anomaly-detection systems are heavily reliant
on statistical or machine learning techniques, although its
effectiveness has sometimes been questioned. [2]. The author
argues that machine learning is most effective in anomaly-
detection when the misuse activity is similar to something
previously seen, alibi the exact definition of the activity may
not be needed. This means that the system needs to be fed a-
priori knowledge on the basis of which it can draw conclusions
and identify a data-set as anomalous. This may not always
be possible. As newer attacks are increasingly coming to the
forefront, any prior knowledge of them may not exist.
This motivates us into exploring graph-based anomaly detec-
tion. The main advantages that this method over any other are:
(a) networks represented as graphs can be explored for their
correlations over a long-period of time. (b) a graph entity is
not analyzed in isolation, but in correlation to other entities, (c)
multi-dimensional characteristics can be analyzed at a singular
level as well as in clusters, both big and small.
Within graph based network data analysis, we explore infor-
mation centrality (IC) as a method to identify central nodes
from a given network. These nodes are important because of
the way they are identified as central. IC uses the location and
connectivity of nodes in a given graph to identify those that
are quickly accessible. This makes them quicker to respond or
identify any change in network behavior. We use this property
of information centrality to identify important nodes, followed
by using these nodes to detect anomalous behavior in the
network.
Anomaly detection mainly depends on how the detector is
built and what needs to be detected. Same detection principle
cannot apply for all kinds of attacks. A spear phishing attack
targets one clearly identified user (called spear phishing) has
a different attack signature as opposed to a denial of service
attack or malware targeted towards a larger organization. An
attack signature is a unique way of identifying a pattern of
information that describes an attempt to exploit a system.
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In this research, we identify volume anomalies, a class of
anomaly that affects a large part of the network. Examples
of attacks where this kind of anomaly detection can be useful
include: DoS (Denial of Service) attacks, unusual end-user file
transfer, etc.
The key approach is described in three parts: First, it is demon-
strated that Information Centrality (IC) can condense a large
graph representing an IoT network called graph-sparsification
by identifying nodes that may prove to be central in exhibiting
the overall network behavior. This is a critical step in reducing
computational complexity associated with large networks since
focus is on fewer nodes. Second, the approach is substantiated
by simulating a mid-sized ZigBee network (200 nodes) using
NS-2 over a mesh topology. The packet transfer uses constant
bit rate (CBR) over an AODV routing protocol. Third, a large
quantity of packets is introduced that can lead to detecting
volume anomaly in the network. By this we mean, the anomaly
impacts a large part of the network and is detected by several
entities. Through various simulation experiments, we evaluate
the ability of central nodes to identify anomaly. We change the
data packet size when it is introduced as an anomalous occur-
rence in the network. Although, this approach is optimized
for deployment on constrained nodes with limited energy and
memory capacity but can be extended to other networks.
II. LITERATURE STUDY OF ANOMALY DETECTION
Intrusion detection in networks identifies the presence of
an internal or external miscreant that should be quarantined
or removed at the earliest. For this, NIDS tools have been
created using distinguishable technologies, anomaly detection
being one of them. As mentioned earlier, using this technique,
systems identify deviations from expected behavior based on
the description of normal system activity [3].
Chandola et. al [4] extensively cover various anomaly
detectors as well as the application domain and knowledge
disciplines they are developed for. Machine learning offers
a wide range of tools for today’s systems, such as neural
networks, support vector machines, etc. However, [2]
expresses concern that machine learning is rarely employed
in practice because of the large variation of benign traffic in
operational real world setting. While this may not hold true
anymore, as many current security systems have successfully
deployed machine learning techniques, a key take away from
this paper was that a sound understanding of the system that
needs protection is needed.
We are also of the opinion that the most critical requirement
for creating a relevant tool for any environment is to gain
deep insights into the system functioning, capabilities, and
limitations. Treating one like a black-box and expecting the
detection tool to work instantly, will lead to erroneous results
and very high false-positives. A quick fix to this is to increase
the sensitivity of the tool. But one cannot guarantee this will
remain an effective strategy over time.
III. GRAPH BASED ANALYTICS
Large networks send enormous amount of data from one
device to another in order to exchange information. For
this, they identify routes that have the shortest overhead to
the network, and yet can reliably communicate with various
nodes. Aside from scaling issues due to incredible number of
devices and their connectivity, understanding the behavior of
the network at a given time is very challenging and poses a
series of problems. Results are generated after analyzing data
that not only comes from the connected devices, but also links
that connect them and other network managing entities.
The success of a network monitor is thus crucially dependent
on how timely can it report metrics that are useful in under-
standing the behavior of the network, including any notewor-
thy changes. These changes can direct the network analyst
towards issues that can affect the network and its users. Con-
temporary network monitors use intrusion detection systems,
firewalls, network and device event logs, or a combination of
these for this purpose. Besides straightforward techniques that
identify deviation from the threshold of network measurement
attributes, there are other statistical techniques that have been
successfully deployed.
Graphs can be used to model a wide variety of structures
and relationships, like networks, and give us terminologies
to explain them. Since graphs have the ability to visualize
a system at a higher level, they give us insights by asking
questions that can help develop the solution. For example,
during the course of coming up with an approach, a researcher
is asked pertinent questions such as - what will be the size
of the graph, will it be dense or sparse, which algorithms
will be most suitable for a graph with a given structure and
attributes, will the graph be dynamic or static, etc. Although
these questions appear general purpose in the beginning, they
indeed provide deep insights into the problem and possible
approaches.
In this section, we examine the structural properties of net-
works and briefly review relevant properties using graph
theory. Consider a graph consisting of a vertex for each device,
and a directed edge from a vertex if the corresponding device
contains a network link in that direction to the other one.
This graph is called the network graph and represents the link
structure of devices on the network. Since a link corresponds
to communication channel over which data transfer from one
node to another in a given direction, it embodies the idea that
it contains relevant information. And that the node plays a
relevant role in transferring this data to its final destination.
And, the node is able to do that precisely because of its
location and connection to other nodes. The weight of all the
edges is constant across the graph, and hence does not play a
differentiating role for a particular edge. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that the structural relevance of a node with respect
to other nodes in the graph is called the information centrality
of the node. Like all centrality measure, IC is also a relative
metric and does not find an absolute value.
Using links, the graph shows connections between various en-
tities, like people or web pages, which in turn are represented
by nodes.
Similar estimates of important vertices in a graph have
been proposed earlier, but they all apply to other application
domains. No comprehensive, and accepted usage scenario
is available in literature. This is precisely what makes this
research unique and an attempt to break new grounds in the
field of communication network analysis.
A. Centrality Measure and Usage Paradigm
The concept of centrality indices, or just centrality, origi-
nally came in the late 1940s from studying human commu-
nication in small groups [6]. Soon centrality gained a strong
foothold as an estimate of an individual’s importance in social
networks [7]. It established relationships between particular
structural features of a network and an actor’s influence. In
other words, it identified ”the most important actor” or ”the
most useful entity” in a social graph (where a vertex is an
actor), alibi using ad-hoc formalization. With time, many
centrality measures were introduced, which were based on the
link between pair of vertices, namely- degree, betweenness,
closeness, eigenvector, information [5], etc. These measures
and linkages between actors were used in several network-
analytic studies to evaluate fairly large networks successfully
[9]. Nevertheless, the focus of research remained on social
networks, community organizations, and planning for the most
part. However, recent conceptual work identifies the suitability
of centrality measures in communication networks [10]. It
exhibits a close relationship between flow of current in an
electrical network and random walks around a graph. These
results served as one of the key stimuli behind using centrality
measure in communication networks.
Centrality measures also suffer from a major drawback. When
not used for the appropriate network, or flow, they can often
lead to incorrect understanding of results. If the centrality
does not relate to the purported index, it becomes difficult
to understand the measurement. Hence, a clear understanding
of the concept of centrality type and its potential for an
application is very important. For example, degree centrality
counts the number of ties incident upon a node and is not
the correct choice for identifying central nodes based on
information flow.
Each measure identifies central nodes depending on the type
of network and connections, as well as the specific feature
that defines it. Here, we only describe Information Centrality
in detail. We provide an intuitive rationale and an empirical
demonstration of the utility of Information Centrality.
Information Centrality (IC) measure is based on the informa-
tion contained in all possible paths between pairs of nodes
in a graph [8]. IC has not been explored extensively so far
for any kind of network. Its understanding has therefore, been
quite vague in terms of applicability, and usage methodology.
In this research, we’ve extended the usage of IC for the first
time and demonstrated it empirically through simulation based
experiments. The reason we consider this metric is because of
two primary reasons. Firstly, no other metric can be used as
they cover different aspects of a graph that have no relation
to data flow, node location, or time taken by packets to travel
between nodes.
Earlier research uses IC on networks represented by non-
directional graphs in which information is important and
central nodes are found. However, in all the previous work,
there are several limitations. They consider all paths between
a pair of nodes and use that to identify central nodes. They
use non-directional networks, which is not how real networks
exist. None of the previous work demonstrate the usage of IC
in communication networks [14].
Betweenness Centrality refers to identifying central nodes
based on the frequency with which a node lies between pairs of
source and destination nodes in the network. In communication
networks, the betweenness centrality is a measure of the degree
that each node lies between other nodes, transfers packets
and thereby gains a sense of importance in contribution to a
solution. The higher the frequency of the packets transferred
through a node to other nodes, the higher the betweenness
centrality, which in turn makes the node participation very
important the network. However, with information centrality,
the centrality of the node is defined by using the harmonic
average. A major difference between how we use IC and its
original definitions is that we do not use all paths to calculate
the information measure for each node. We instead use the
IC formula along routes that are defined as geodesics and
paths only [15]. The information measure,between two nodes
is defined as the reciprocal of the topological distance between
the corresponding nodes[8][13],
Iij = 1/dij
Since, reciprocal of the inter node distance is the reciprocal of
data transfer, the information between two nodes is the inverse
of this inter-node distance. When several routes can transfer
data between the same pair of source-destination nodes, the
information is calculated considering all these paths. In the
real world of communication networks, these routes are mostly
shortest paths(geodesics) or the next best option if the shortest
path is unavailable(paths). Hence, we use these two distance
measuring options to calculate the IC of a node that fall
between various pairs of source-destination nodes.
Weight between nodes or bandwidth is kept same between
nodes as that too would affect the choice of central nodes [8].
IV. EXPERIMENT
A. Motivation
The goals behind simulating a communication network and
using information centrality to identify central nodes are:
Firstly, to see if the simulations point to the same central nodes
as when calculating the information centrality. And secondly,
to see if the central nodes can indeed identify anomalous
behavior earlier than the combined data from all the nodes
from the network.
B. Network Simulator
We use a popular network simulation platform called net-
work simulator 2(NS2)[12]. It is an open source event-driven
simulator widely used in the research community to simulate
computer communication networks[11]. It contains several
modules for numerous network components, which can be
studied using the extensive literature available online for free.
C. Simulation Environment
The setup chosen for the simulations is based on the
scenario where several sensor nodes are connected to various
devices in and out of reach environment. These sensor nodes
store data from the surroundings and forward them to a
central, more powerful node, which in turn sends it to a
server in the cloud.
We choose ZigBee technology to simulate this setup as it is a
low cost, low power consumption, and short distance wireless
communication technology. It was developed for wireless
personal area network (WPAN) in early 2000. The main
advantages of simulating ZigBee is that it is widely used in
the building automation control, monitoring and control of
IoT. It gives us a relatively simpler environment to test our
hypothesis on, as well as is much easier to gain expertise
in. As mentioned earlier, domain expertise is the top criteria
for analyzing any system effectively. We use mesh network
topology for ZigBee devices as it allows full peer-to-peer
communication and routing is decentralized. Ad-hoc on
demand distance vector (AODV) routing is used. We keep the
nodes static as this prevents routes from changing frequently.
This further allows us to track packets, follow their routing
thus making it easier to demonstrate and prove our approach.
This, however, in no way is a limitation, and is one of the
topics for future work of our research.
Table I summarizes the general simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 200
Simulation Area 100x100
Total simulation time 900 s
Number of simulations 100
Traffic Type CBR
Queue Model Queue/DropTail/PriQueue
Max. packets in Queue 1000
Packet rate 2/ms
Packet Size 0.5KB
Total connections 35
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
D. Method
Once the experimental setup is ready, the NS2 simulator is
run using the code written in Tcl/OTcl language. The location
for each node is randomly calculated using a python script.
The simulation can be visualized using Nam visualization tool,
which is part of NS2. A post simulation trace file is generated
after the tcl script is run and is used as an input to Nam. We
wrote another python script to analyze and comprehend the
trace file. It is using this data set that we calculate the arrival
time of packets on various nodes for all packet transfers. This
is a crucial part of our research. By recording the time it takes
for a packet to reach a node, we can identify those nodes that
are the ones that are reached in the shortest time. This is what
makes them central to the network.
We repeated this simulation hundred times for various combi-
nation of source and destination nodes, thereby simulating the
flow of data packets in the network and ensuring that we get
a similar set of nodes as central nodes. The topology remains
the same for all the simulations. The multiple number of
simulations ensured that we covered all possible data transfer
routes and got similar results. The route taken by the packets
followed the route defined by AODV routing protocol which
we described in earlier section.
AODV is a reactive or on-demand protocol and discovers
routes as and when there is a need to transfer packets between
nodes. Its ultimate goal is to avoid duplication or re-sending
the same packet, which is accomplished by keeping a sequence
number for preventing loops and keeping the fresh most route.
Each node maintains its monotonically increasing sequencing
number which increases every time the node notices change
in neighborhood topology. So when a route request is sent
from a node towards the nodes that possibly fall on the path
of destination node, the routing protocol makes sure that no
loops are encountered. In graph theory language, this means
that trail and walks cannot be used to find distance between
pairs of nodes. This leaves us with two options - geodesics and
path. Geodesic can be called the distance with the shortest
route, and path can be any route between nodes where no
node or link is repeated. Once we had average arrival times
of all nodes, we chose the top 15%-20% nodes when ranked
in ascending order of average arrival time. It is to be noted
here that we compared the results of central nodes calculated
using our simulations and the information centrality measure.
We further use this result to understand the role played by
these central nodes in the networked graph.
The goal of our research is to find novel ways of detecting
intrusions in communication networks by detecting anomalous
behavior in these networks. Our next step post identification
of central nodes is to use them for anomaly detection. We
hypothesize that since the central nodes are crucial to the flow
of information in the network, they should also be central to
flow of anomaly in the network. Here it is important to remind
our readers that anomalies can be of different categories. Since
IC is calculated based on the flow of information in an entire
network, same holds true for the anomaly. Our initial intuition
is that central nodes can help identify attacks and its related
anomaly, which spreads across a network. Example of such
an attack is denial of service (dos) and a possible related
anomaly could be excessive ping commands on a certain
network port. We use the same central nodes identified earlier
for our simulated network and monitor the behavior of these
nodes when an anomaly is introduced into the network.
Parameter Value
Normal packet size 0.5Kb
Anomalous packet size 10Mb, 50Mb
Anomaly origin randomly selected 5% nodes
Central nodes chosen top 15%, 20%
Anomaly injected 80th sec
TABLE II
ANOMALY PARAMETERS
E. Results and Analysis
The goal of this experiment is to demonstrate the impact
central nodes can have when employed for anomaly detection.
To this end, we monitor the behavior of all nodes, including
central nodes and capture their effectiveness in detecting
anomaly. We keep a track of the time when the anomalous
behavior is identified w.r.t the anomaly injection time. We then
compare the percentage of central versus non-central nodes
that have identified the anomaly since injection. See Figure 2
below for a comparison.
Fig. 1. Comparison of detection times of central nodes vs. other nodes.
In this research, we assume that the anomaly detector is
fairly efficient and do not delve deep into the false rate of the
detection mechanism. This is being further analyzed in our
future research.
The results show us that for an Anomaly of size 10MB,
and monitoring top 15%-20% of central nodes, as the anomaly
propagates into the network the central nodes are able to detect
its presence faster than the rest of the nodes. Monitoring the
central nodes is a useful exercise in comparison to monitoring
the entire network as approximately 90% of central nodes were
aware of the anomaly while only approximately 50% of non-
central nodes for the duration of the simulation.
For an Anomaly of size 50MB, and monitoring top 15%-
20% of central nodes: As the anomaly propagates into the
network the central nodes are able to detect its presence faster
than the rest of the nodes Monitoring the central nodes is a
useful exercise in comparison to monitoring the entire network
as approximately 99% of central nodes were aware of the
anomaly while only approximately 60%-65% of non-central
nodes for the duration of the simulation.
Another advantage of using central nodes is the lack of
reliance on special hardware or devices dedicated to intrusion
detection. The central nodes a wholly part of the network and
can accomplish the detection part without dedicating a lot of
memory and procession power to the task.
V. CONCLUSION
The main contributions of this research include proving
that Information Centrality can be used in communication
networks for identifying important nodes. These nodes are
significant because of the control they have on the flow of
information. IC identifies these nodes based on their location
and connectivity to other nodes using a harmonic average
of the distance. The simulation compares these values by
calculating the average arrival times of data from other nodes
along the routes identified in graph theory as geodesics and
path. Because of this reason, anomalies, like regular data, also
travel past these central nodes and can be identified earlier.
This is in comparison to the analysis provided by running an
IDS through all the nodes in the network and how quick can it
identify the presence of a volume anomaly in the network. We
do make it clear that the focus of our research is on volume
anomalies that spread across the network and are not targeted
attacks or intrusion efforts.
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